Abstract: This paper stresses that the impacts of climate change would be distributed unevenly over future generations in a yet unknown way. It also discusses the limitations of mainstream economics to deal with issues of intergenerational equity, noting the possibilities of different ways to select an appropriate discount rate. Given these limitations, great care must be applied in using tools from economics on the problems considered. The paper looks into ways that international law defines intergenerational equity and considers the application of Weiss' three basic principles: conservation of options, conservation of quality, and conservation of access, to the implementation of a system of 'planetary rights'. Finally, five different operational models are applied to ethical consideration of the concept of common, but differentiated responsibilities -utilitarian, realist (power relations), equitable commons, fiduciary trust, and earthrights.
Introduction -Do we have a problem?
Natural ecosystems have evolved simultaneously and collectively on our small planet during the last two billion years. For a small fraction of that period, about two million years, human life has spread across the surface of the globe and has come to dominate other forms of biological activity. For most of the last ten thousand years, human societies have developed traditions of cooperative activity and periodically engaged in spasms of locally or regionally destructive behaviors. In our century and for the first time, human societies developed the capability to alter the basic forces governing the pattern of life on this planet. Over the last sixty years, we humans have begun to harness the power of technology and the engines of economic growth in ways that threaten to undermine and possibly eliminate biological life on Earth.
Detrimental human impacts resulting from activities with economic importance to the current generation are increasing. The forms in which these detrimental human influences may be felt include:
• shifts in the spectral distribution of electromagnetic radiation reaching the Earth's surface (a consequence of stratospheric ozone depletion); • forced extinction of species which have survived two billion years of natural cycles (due to exposure to persistent toxins or habitat destruction); and • explosive release of energy stored in atomic nuclei (due to intra-or inter-regional conflicts over resources and influence).
All economic activity depends on essential ecosystem services [1] . At current levels of human activity, even without catastrophic episodes or irreversible elimination of other life forms, human societies are placing historic stresses on these underlying ecosystems [2] . Replacing existing natural systems with engineered systems to deliver the same services would be impossible in most cases and prohibitively expensive in the rest.
Modern economies pre-empt and consume approximately 25% of the Earth's net primary productivity (NPP, the global measure of worldwide photosynthetic output). In terms of the primary productivity of the terrestrial biosphere alone (to which mankind has the widest and easiest access), human societies are currently 'eating the seed-corn', harvesting renewable energy forms at unprecedented (and, many would argue, unsustainable) rates. Today's economies are collectively consuming the fundamental 'profits' of biological activity at annual rates approaching 40% of the total output of terrestrial photosynthesis [3] . Current understanding of the Earth's bio-geo-physical system strongly suggests that there are limits to the carrying capacity of this planet. [1] If current trends continue, we -the human race -may soon begin approaching that limit.
Regardless of the size of present resource flows appropriated in support of human consumption and the potential risks these flows may raise for future generations, the physical products of human activity and the associated economic rents are not now being distributed fairly among the living representatives of human societies. National, ethnic and class inequalities continue to create inter-group tensions that increase the probability of organized violence and war. The resulting conflicts, involving both national and subnational entities, have destructive potentials at both regional and global scales. If these trends continue, the stresses produced by the current pattern of economic activities could permanently reduce the patrimony of future generations in ways our forefathers would have found unthinkable.
In the following sections, this paper:
1 discusses the long-term trends and cyclical behaviours of the global climate system; 2 highlights the key trends of climate change in the next century;
3 examines the overall objectives of international cooperative efforts to respond to the risks of human-induced climate change; 4 summarizes what is known about the distribution of climate impacts if current trends continue, 5 assesses the lessons that can be learned from mainstream economics about the equitable distribution of the costs of climate change across generations; 6 reviews the treatment of intergenerational equity in international law; and 7 compares what can thus be learned with a selection from the writings of modern ethicists and philosophers on this subject.
Why worry about climate change?
The global climate represents the long-term pattern of weather events averaged over the surface of the planet. Observed at planetary scale, the climate results from a combination of dynamic and stochastic processes whose patterns of interaction shift over time. On periods of the order of 20,000 to 100,000 years, the Earth's climate oscillates between warm, equable periods and cold, bleak, ice ages. The planet is currently approaching the anticipated conclusion of one of the longest warm, equable periods in the recent geologic record [4] . The realization of the climate at any period in time is the product of continuous interaction among these processes, mediated through a set of complex, non-linear systems. These systems include the world ocean, the terrestrial landmass, the biosphere, the cryosphere, and the global atmosphere. The relationships among these systems exhibit characteristic thresholds of sensitivity to each other and to external processes. Over geologic history, crossing of these thresholds has been associated periodically with major changes of state for the climate system. The specific events that triggered historical changes of state are not completely known today. Nor do scientists understand the sensitivities in the present system that may trigger future changes of state.
The long, largely cyclical, pattern of natural processes notwithstanding, major change is underway. The Scientific Working Group of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC WG 1) has determined that there is credible evidence to suggest that human activity is having "a discernible impact on the global climate system" [4] . Human activities appear to be changing the composition and behaviour of the atmosphere in specific and profound ways.
In particular, since the beginning of the Industrial Age, economically important activities on all continents and in all countries have significantly increased the atmospheric concentration of a number of radiatively active trace gases. The concentration of carbon dioxide, CO 2 , has increased about 25% during the last two centuries and by over 10% in the last forty years. The atmospheric concentration of methane, CH 4 , which was roughly stable for the last 10,000 years, has doubled during the last two centuries. Chlorofluorocarbons, wholly absent from the primordial atmosphere, can now be measured in parts per billion by volume [4] .
Anthropogenic emission rates of several greenhouse gases are increasing, and already exceed natural removal rates. These gaseous emissions, individually and collectively, increase the natural heat-trapping capability of the atmosphere [4] . Current emissions trajectories show clear upward trends at the global level, although there are important regional differences in the patterns of emissions. Industrial countries are responsible for about 75% of the cumulative build-up of greenhouse gases and for about 70% of current emissions. Emissions rates in developing countries are growing and their collective annual emissions could exceed the total rate of emissions from industrial countries as early as the second quarter of the next century.
What is likely to happen?
The future is always uncertain; thus predicting the future is a risky business. Modern science is no better at predicting long-term climate than it is at predicting the gross national product five years from now. But scientists can still say some useful things about the path ahead and about patterns of climate change over the next several generations.
The IPCC concludes that the observed warming of the last century, approximately 0.5-0.7 o C, is at least partly a consequence of the anthropogenic build-up of greenhouse gases. If current trends continue through the next century, the cumulative effect of the composite build-up is expected to warm the surface of the planet significantly, perhaps by as much as [2] [3] [4] o C [4] . Such a warming may sound small, but it is worth noting that a warming of only 1 o C is all that separates today's conditions from the climatic patterns of the Little Ice Age that chilled the development of Northern Europe and North America in the 14th to 17th centuries. An increase in average annual surface temperature of just 2 o C from today's level will take the planet outside the range that has been experienced during most of the last one million years.
Large-scale computer models of the global climate system (called general circulation models or GCMs) and paleoclimatic proxy data indicate that changes of the type projected by IPCC WG 1 for the next one or two centuries have been associated in the past with major changes of state for key climatic variables. These include, for example, significant shifts in the Florida or Gulf Stream current and alteration of the the associated process of thermo-haline circulation in the North Atlantic Ocean. (This process is sometimes referred to as North Atlantic Deep Water formation or NADW [5] [6] [7] .) Some recent ice core evidence suggests that changes in NADW formation may have stimulated extensive and sudden cold spells in the Northern Hemisphere. Past shifts from warm, equable climate to icy conditions in this hemisphere may have occurred over periods as short as a few decades [8, 9] . There is a small, positive, non-zero probability that this type of change in ocean heat circulation could, in principle, be among the triggers for shifting meta-stable states of the global climate. Entry into these altered climate states may have irreversible consequences for some species, including those that are currently threatened or endangered. From the perspective of the IPCC, these changes could occur on a time frame of interest to policy-makers and other decision-makers reading the IPCC's Third Assessment Report (TAR).
Even if human-induced climate change does not cause irreversible or catastrophic impacts at the global or species level, the impacts of global warming due to the greenhouse effect could be quite severe at a national or regional level [10] . The best current estimates of global sea-level rise due to greenhouse warming under a business-asusual scenario suggest complete inundation of some small island states during the next century. Low-lying deltaic regions could be similarly affected and may also suffer increased vulnerability to salt-water intrusion into aquifers and to storm surges following tropical typhoons.
Changes in the timing and distribution of rainfall could affect agricultural output and undermine food security at the regional level both in the North and in the South. And these disruptions could occur even if global levels of agricultural productivity remain effectively unchanged.
Regional patterns of warming may alter the range of hospitable habitats available to various vectors of disease. Such changes could result in shifts in the timing or extent of infectious disease outbreaks [10] .
A number of keen observers, including many insurance and reinsurance companies now believe that historical weather patterns are no longer a reliable indicator of future trends. They have seen a rapid increase in claims for weather-related damages and find their existing actuarial tables do not give reliable information about the likely exposure to future risks. They are concerned by reports from the scientific community that suggest the frequency and severity of extreme weather episodes could increase in some regions over the coming decades due to global warming, with economically significant consequences for human societies and the built environment.
Many of the physical impacts of climate change will look familiar. They will look like many other weather-related stresses experienced by human societies during the last 10,000 years. Most will involve local disruptions and not catastrophes. But some of the expected impacts of climate change may involve irreversible effects. Warming temperatures and associated changes in rainfall patterns may drive some communities and some species to extinction. Endangered montagne species living at the edge of their temperature sensitivity could, for example, find that there is not enough room to retreat further up their local mountains as the world warms. Indigenous peoples faced with growing water stress due to changing rainfall patterns and increasing encroachment by their modern brethren, could disappear if they cannot move to suitable new quarters or adapt to the new conditions.
What is the international community trying to do?
Regardless of the risks, it is not possible to stop climate change, nor is it plausible to attempt to do so. Indeed, climate change is not a problem. Climate has been changing for thousands of millennia, with the Earth oscillating through the cycles of hot and cold described above. Barring some dramatic and fatal human intervention, the Earth's climate is likely to continue to change for centuries and millennia to come.
In spite of long human experience with natural climate variability, rapid anthropogenic climate change is a relatively new problem. It creates a set of real and potentially profound risks for human societies and natural ecosystems. International cooperative concern about climate change is focused on slowing the rate of growth in greenhouse gas concentrations so as to limit the probability of crossing one of the suspected but unseen thresholds of high sensitivity in the climate system. To a small but increasing extent, attention is being directed toward the challenges of coping with the risks of rapid climate change and the unavoidable impacts of historical as well as future emissions. In particular, the IPCC has acknowledged the importance of the linkages between climate change and issues concerning development, equity and sustainability, by making a special effort to deal with such interactions in its ongoing work [11, 12] .
In this regard, more than 160 countries have signed and ratified the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [13] . Article 2 of the Climate Convention establishes as the ultimate objective of the collective enterprise:
"To achieve…stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner."
Achieving this objective will require that a consensus be reached on what constitutes dangerous interference with the climate system and on some shared understanding of sustainable economic development, the rights of future generations, and the role of intergenerational equity. The rest of the present paper explores these challenges, aware that in our current situation, we are a bit like a man driving a car on a foggy night towards a bridge that some have said may be 'washed out'. The challenge for the IPCC is to know how to advise governments, enterprises, and individuals on finding the most appropriate route to a 'safe landing', including the most adaptive response strategies for coping with an uncertain and potentially deadly risk.
Whose problem is this?
Modern science is unable to identify the points of maximum sensitivity in the response of the physical climate system to human-induced perturbations of the atmosphere. Current scientific knowledge is also insufficient to predict with confidence the timing and regional distribution of impacts from either gradual or abrupt climate change due to greenhouse warming. The international scientific community cannot predict with confidence which specific countries or regions will be most severely affected or which generations of human beings will experience the most negative impacts. Nonetheless, there is good reason to expect that the impacts of climate change may have significant disruptive effects on economic activity and national development strategies for both industrial and developing countries during the next century [14] .
In addition to impacts of climate change, likely stresses include: • the challenges of growing populations facing fixed or even shrinking endowments of natural resources;
• the stresses on national and community institutions due to growing income disparities and other financial pressures;
• increasing losses of tropical forests and declining biodiversity resources;
• expanding deserts; rising levels of pollution and congestion;
• forest die-back and loss of fertile topsoil; and
• heightened exposure to ultra-violet radiation.
It is clear that these environmental and social stresses will not be realized one at a time or in isolation. They will occur together or consecutively and will be realized in some largely unpredictable combination of events. The stresses will be distributed worldwide. The regional pattern of risk distribution is unknown and may remain unpredictable for decades to come. No country can be assured that it will escape the impacts of climate change or the interaction of climate change with the other identified stresses. No one alive today can know if his children, grandchildren, or great-grandchildren will be among those penalized by the long-term climatic consequences of today's economically important activities.
There is good reason to believe that the problem of global warming due to human emissions of greenhouse gases is not a crisis in the classical sense. There is no enemy at the gates. There realistic fear of imminent destruction. The onset of global warming, though rapid in geological terms, is likely to be rather leisurely in historical terms. Realization of severe potential impacts is unlikely to occur in a widespread fashion for decades to come. The most extreme damages are expected to occur in the far distant future, perhaps one, two or even three centuries from now.
Some would argue that if the casualties of this problem are unknown and the damages are a long way off, whose problem is this? Why should we even consider climate change as a problem for current decision-makers? The answer to both questions is simple. Global warming due to the greenhouse effect is a problem for the current generation of humans because science has warned us about the dangers. It is also 'our' problem because the growing risk of future climate change is largely a consequence of economically important decisions taken today to benefit citizens of contemporary polities.
What then are the tools available today to policy analysts and decision-makers wishing to address these challenges and manage these risks? The following sections explore, in a very preliminary and simplistic way, some of the insights offered for this work by traditional economists, international legal theorists, and modern ethicists.
What can mainstream economics tell us?
Economics has long been concerned with trade-offs between consumption, investment, and savings. For the last seventy years, economists have given careful thought to these trade-offs between generations [15] . One issue in responding to the risks of humaninduced climate change can be framed in terms of a trade-off between consumption today (leading to increasing emissions of greenhouse gases) and investment now for the benefit of future generations. Most economists use the discount rate as a tool for evaluating this trade-off. Another important component of this trade-off is the consideration of sustainability or sustainable development. We will take up the question of the discount rate first and then come back to the issue of sustainability.
Economists use the discount rate as their principal tool for comparing costs and benefits occurring in different periods of time [16] . Investments in physical, social and environmental capital are generally assumed to yield a positive net return over time. The discount rate is used to express these future values in a common numeraire, indexed to the value of funds in the present period. Many analysts have suggested ways to select an appropriate discount rate for conventional investment projects [17] [18] [19] [20] .
The discount rate can be used similarly to evaluate the trade-off between the costs of efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions today and the benefits to future generations who, as a result of these investments, may avoid the damages that would otherwise occur due to the impacts of climate change. The lag between the investments today and the accrual of future benefits may be measured in decades or centuries. Thus, the choice of the discount rate can have great significance to the valuation of these costs and benefits. The resulting valuation is likely to influence the choice between competing investments or current consumption [16] . Both the duration of the period and the rate of discounting will affect the valuation of net benefits or costs.
For example, assume that the damages from impacts of climate change occurring 100 years from now were estimated to be US$25 trillion, approximately equal to current global GDP. If these damages were discounted at a rate of 10% (not untypical for a World Bank investment project, for example), their net present value would be approximately US$2 billion. This is approximately equal to the cost of one B-1 bomber or to the purchase price of a single 1GW(e) nuclear power plant built today. If the same damages occurred 200 years from now and were discounted at the same rate of 10%, their net present value would be reduced to only US$132,000. On the other hand, if these damages were discounted at only 2% for 200 years, their net present value would rise to approximately US$476 billion.
The algebra of discount rates led D'Arge et al. [21] to conclude that catastrophic losses far in the future have almost no value to present-day decision-makers if conventional discount rates are used to evaluate their costs and benefits. D'Arge further concludes that, given the uncertainty about the future looking over periods of a century or more, the utility of any estimates of the net benefits and costs of climate change 100 years out is extremely limited and the value could even shift from positive to negative, based on the discount rate applied by the analyst.
Because future generations cannot communicate their preferences to those present today, climate policy raises a number of important challenges, mainly concerned with equity issues across generations [22, 23, 1] . It is important to note that use of a relatively high discount rate in evaluating climate policy decisions favours investment in current period consumption. Such discount rates discourage investment in mitigation activities whose principle benefits will accrue to generations 100 or more years from now. On the other hand, use of low or zero discount rates encourages investment in mitigation or capital-building projects in lieu of consumption today.
Approaches to selecting an appropriate discount rate
Arrow et al. [16] explore a range of sophisticated approaches to choosing a discount rate for comparing long-term costs and benefits. Arrow et al. start from the generally accepted approach of decomposing the discount rate, d, into two independent terms by the equation: d= r + tg where r = the rate of pure time preference, t = the absolute value of the elasticity of marginal utility g= the growth rate of per capita consumption for future generations.
This formulation allows the analyst to consider systematically a number of important issues, including the treatment of risk or uncertainty, the valuation of non-market goods, and the treatment of intergenerational equity. Arrow et al. [16] note that most economists, rather than adjusting the discount rate, treat risk by transforming uncertain future outcomes into the certainty equivalents of those outcomes. They then discount the certainty equivalents. Following the same approach, uncertain environmental impacts can be converted into consumption equivalents and then discounted.
Arrow et al. highlight two approaches to estimating an appropriate discount rate using the above formula. The prescriptive approach is based on the design of a social welfare function derived from ethical principles. It is constructed as a measure of the consumption of all individuals in a society. This approach often leads to a low estimate of the discount rate, with analysts often assuming that the pure rate of time preference is zero (i.e., benefits to future generations are valued as highly as those which redound to individuals in the present generation).
By contrast, the descriptive approach is based on estimates of real rates of return on investment in the current period [24] . This approach is often used to justify relatively high rates of discount and favours consumption in the current period over investment for the future.
Arrow et al. [24] conclude that:
"The prescriptive approach can be interpreted as doing as much as is economically justified to reduce the risk of climate change; the descriptive approach can be interpreted as maximizing the economic resources available for future generations and allowing them to decide how to use the resources".
Thus, the choice of a method for estimating the discount rate and the level of the discount rate selected have powerful effects on the kinds of policies that can be recommended with confidence to policy-makers. The choice of a method and the selection of a rate represent judgments by the economist and are not value free. The rate selected communicates clear preferences on the part of the economist between investment for the future and consumption today. By implication, it also communicates a preference comparing the relative importance of benefits to present versus future generations.
Intergenerational equity and sustainability
The issue of intergenerational equity is also closely linked to the concepts of growth and sustainability. The most famous definition of sustainability is that of the Brundtland Commission report [25] which identifies sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the needs of the future." This formulation suggests a value system that gives equal weight to generations present today and those yet unborn. Economists, on the other hand, offer a variety of approaches to the issue of sustainability. Most focus on sustaining the stock of physical capital along with annual income derived from capital (and labour). Some treatments introduce consideration of natural capital or natural resource stocks, but none yet addresses the role of social capital as a component of sustainability. Pezzey [26] defines economic growth as increasing the aggregate value of consumption, not the physical throughput of the economy. Pezzey suggests a variety of definitions for sustainable development that include:
• non-declining output over time,
• non-declining output with increasing minimum per capita income,
• non-declining output with minimal per capita income sufficient to meet basic needs and less than some ecologically sustainable level.
Pezzey's definitions focus on the impacts of activity on economic output and income. The last of Pezzey's definitions begins to incorporate a measure of an environmental constraint on economic activity.
Solow [19] offers an interesting extension of sustainability to cover natural stocks of exhaustible resources. Solow regards a system as sustainable if the legacy left for the next generation is of equal value to that inherited by the present generation, even if some of its endowment of natural resources is consumed. It assumes that man-made capital can be substituted for any natural resources consumed by the present generation.
Pearce et al. [27] introduces the idea that sustainability involves the conservation of the total stock of natural resources for use by future generations. By this Pearce does not mean that all stocks of all natural resources must be conserved for an indefinite period. Rather he suggests that each generation owes the next a debt, i.e., the debt is a commitment to leave an equal endowment of natural resources, allowing for trade-offs among resources that do not threaten overall sustainability.
Markandya and Pearce [28] recognize that economic activity may lead to the degradation of environmental assets or the irreversible consumption of natural capital. They conclude that sustainability can still be maintained if environmental damage is compensated by specific projects that 'add something back' into the environment. This addition should leave future generations no worse off and may improve the situation of current inhabitants. They assume implicitly that environmental benefit derived from the specific project is acceptable and equal in value to the environmental capital that was lost.
The variety of approaches described above reflects a range of views on sustainability and the rights of future generations. Most of the economists whose work is reviewed in this paper show a clear preference for consumption by the current generation compared to investment that would provide a broader capital base for future generations.
Questions, problems, and unresolved issues arising from mainstream economics
The principal problem with the mainstream approaches described above is that the mathematical constructs on which they rely do not reflect the characteristics of the biogeophysical system to which they are being applied. We highlight below a few of the key unresolved issues that arise in the context of climate policy. The fundamental basis of welfare economics is a set of assumptions about the orderly behaviour of economic systems and the natural systems with which they interact. All of the analysts whose work is described here assume that the economic/environmental systems affected by climate change will behave in ways that can be described by smooth, differentiable functions. Each analyst assumes constant elasticity of substitution between productive factors. And each assumes that the natural system in which an economy is embedded will respond to additional perturbations in a smooth and continuous fashion.
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The most important aspects of the climate problem for policymakers are those that present the risks of non-linear and discontinuous responses, causing impacts that may alter the substitutability between productive factors. Such impacts include irreversible changes associated with extinction of species (in which genetic information is irreversibly lost), and major changes of state resulting from shifts in fundamental processes affecting the dynamics of the ocean-atmosphere system. When one of these changes occurs, there is no possibility that man-made capital or labour can be substituted for the loss of natural capital. What is left behind is never an 'equivalent' legacy.
A second major failing in the treatment of mainstream economics lies in the unspoken value judgments and assumptions concerning the tastes and preferences of future generations. Economists assume that the present generation can speak with confidence for the preferences of the unborn. These experts assume that the welfare function describing the preferences of future consumers looks reasonably similar to the preference function that current individuals express through their purchasing decisions in the market. In fact, this assumption is an example of unsupportable intellectual arrogance.
A third flaw in the assumptions of mainstream economics lies in the judgment that greater consumption always adds to collective welfare. Many recent analysts have argued that, on balance, at least in the advanced industrial economies of the OECD, marginal increases in consumption bring negative benefits and increased collective risks. There is no room in the present mathematical treatment of mainstream economics for such discontinuities in the functions assumed to describe individual utility and collective social welfare.
A fourth flaw in the analytic approach of the mainstream economists summarized above is their assumption about longevity of preferences. The assumption that either an individual analyst's judgment or an observation of short-term interest rates is a useful source of information about the preferences of consumers and investors 100 or 200 years from now is valuable in simplifying the computational complexity of many current problems. But no empirical evidence or theoretical basis supports this assumption.
Finally, the value of these analyses is reduced by ignoring the consequences that decisions about financial or natural capital may have on social capital. In many cases, the negative effect of investment decisions on the social capital of a society may dominate the parallel positive impacts on consumption in any one period or among any one sector of society. Recent experience with structural adjustment programs in a number of developing countries suggests that decisions made to reinforce the stability of financial capital may have powerful negative impacts on both natural capital and social capital.
Given the serious limitations of the analytic framework of mainstream economics, great care must be applied in using these tools alone or even primarily as a source of recommendations concerning climate policy.
International law and intergenerational equity
Sustainable development rests on a commitment to equity with future generations. Global environmental change affects the capacity to achieve sustainable development. The implications of global environmental change are inherently long-term, requiring consideration of equity issues spanning two or more generations.
Legal scholars assert that economic instruments alone are not sufficient to the task of addressing the range of issues raised by the challenge of sustainable development. While economics can incorporate representations of certain externalities, these non-market or unpriced elements are usually evaluated from the point of view of the present generation. Reliance on the discount rate to consider future costs and benefits nearly always leads to an emphasis on short-term benefits outweighing long-term costs.
International law is fundamentally concerned with fairness and can address the normative dimension of economic policies. International law has usually incorporated intertemporal issues in the context of relating the present to past obligations. But international law, particularly the law of treaties, also recognizes forward-looking intertemporal issues: the proper interpretation of treaties over time; the continuing validity of treaties under changed circumstances, procedural issues regarding time frames for raising objections, etc.
Since the Second World War, international law has increasingly expressed concern about the welfare of future generations. In its opening paragraph, the UN Charter states "We the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war…" [29] . In the context of protecting the environment, interest in intergenerational equity rose rapidly during the preparations for the UN's 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. The preamble of the Stockholm Declaration affirms its goal "to defend and improve the environment for present and future generations has become an imperative goal for mankind". The Declaration's first principle establishes that "man...bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations," and its second principle specifies that the "natural resources of the earth...must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning and management." [30, p.391] The 1972 London Ocean Dumping Convention, the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, and the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, all explicitly include language covering the notion of protecting the environment for future generations. Later, the negotiations under UNEP on management of regional seas and the negotiations leading to the Law of the Sea Convention raised issues of the welfare of future generations. These concerns have found more recent expression in efforts to develop a 'precautionary principle' for international law, addressing the question of when to limit activities that risk future harm to the environment. First invoked at the 1987 International Conference on the North Sea, the precautionary principle has been carried forward in a variety of formulations, such as that of the July 1990 Group of 7 Ministerial Declaration relating to climate change, which stated that: "in the face of threats of irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty is no excuse to postpone actions which are justified in their own right." [30, p.392] Concurrently, the concept of protecting the natural environment for the benefit of future generations has been widely recognized in national legislation. Some constitutions include reference to future generations explicitly, while many contain provisions imposing duties on the state and on citizens to conserve the natural environment [31, pp.107-108] .
In this growing legal record, one observes a number of different approaches to defining intergenerational environmental equity. Among the most prominent are the following:
1 The preservationist model enjoins the present generation not to destroy or deplete resources or significantly alter the environment, but rather to preserve natural capital for use or investment by future generations and to preserve the same quality in all aspects of the environment. Carried to its extreme, this approach would entail maintaining the status quo unchanged. It would short-change the prospects for development of any kind, and would leave many developing countries with only a subsistence economy.
2 At the opposite pole is an opulence model, under which the present generation consumes at will and creates as much wealth as it can, believing either that it has no obligation to future citizens, or that maximizing present consumption is the best way to maximize future wealth. This model neglects the long-term degradation of the Earth that may result from current consumption as well as the potentially irreversible losses and environmental changes it may cause.
3 The technology model, a variant of the opulence model, holds that the present generation need not concern itself for future generations because technological innovation will allow for infinite resource substitution.
4 The environmental economics model contends that proper natural resource accounting will allow present generations to fulfil any obligations to the future in an economically efficient manner and with minimal risk of long-term, irreversible damage to our common patrimony.
Weiss [30] defines intergenerational equity as a planetary trust. She concludes that:
"Sustainability is possible only if we look at the Earth and its resources not only as an investment opportunity but as a trust, passed to us by our ancestors, to be enjoyed and passed on to our descendants for their use. Such a 'planetary trust' conveys to us both rights and responsibilities. Most importantly, it implies that future generations too have rights -although to be sure, these rights have meaning only if we the living respect them and if this respect transcends the differences among countries, religions and cultures." [30, p.395] The following paragraphs explore Weiss' theory of intergenerational equity as an example of a leading legal approach to this challenging area. She argues that we, the human species, hold the natural environment of our planet in common with all members of our species: past generations, the present generation, and future generations. As members of the present generation, we hold the Earth in trust for future generations. At the same time, we are beneficiaries entitled to use and benefit from what has been left to us by our progenitors. Two fundamental relationships inform this concept of intergenerational equity in relation to the environment:
The implication of the first element is that the human species is linked to all parts of the natural world. As the most sentient of living beings, humans have the responsibility to care for the planet. All humans have an equal place in relations to the natural world, regardless of their generation, and all are inherently linked to each other through it. Weiss [30] adds, "There is no basis for preferring the present generation over future generations in their use of the planet."
Weiss suggests that we take the perspective of a generation that is placed somewhere along the spectrum of time but does not know in advance where it will be located. In this framework, one would want to inherit the earth in at least as good condition as it has been for any previous generation and to have as good access to it as previous generations. If one generation fails to conserve the planet at the level of quality received, succeeding generations have an obligation to repair this damage, even if costly to do so. However, costs can be distributed across several generations, by means of revenue bonds and other financial measures, so that the benefits and costs of remediation are shared. In the best case, the harm that may have resulted from foregone consumption in favour of investment will be sufficiently less than the discounted value of distant future benefits from the derived income so that immediate successor generations have sufficient resources to adapt [30] .
Weiss' proposed theory of intergenerational equity finds its roots in the various religious, cultural and legal traditions of the modern world. Islamic laws, the JudeoChristian tradition, the civil law tradition, African customary law, the non-theistic traditions of Asia, all contain elements of respect for nature and its preservation. Since no one country or group of countries can alone ensure a healthy environment for the future, all must cooperate. As poverty is an important cause of environmental degradation, this approach to international law suggests that development must meet the needs of the poor, so that they too can meet their intergenerational obligations to the planet.
Basic principles of Weiss' theory of intergenerational equity
Three basic principles underlie Weiss' theory of intergenerational equity:
1 Conservation of options. Each generation must conserve the diversity of the natural and cultural resource base so as not to limit unduly the options available to future generations wishing to pursue their own goals and to solve their own problems.
2 Conservation of quality. Each generation should maintain the quality of the planet and pass it on in no worse condition than it was received.
3 Conservation of access. Each generation must provide its members with equitable rights to the heritage received from past generations and should conserve this access for future generations.
The principle of conserving options holds that diversity as well as quality contributes to the robustness of the planetary system. Change and innovation, such as technological developments that create substitutes for existing resources or employ them more efficiently, are as much a part of implementing the principle as is conservation of resources. Application of this principle only requires that, on balance, the diversity of the resource base be maintained. Conserving quality is consistent with environmentally sustainable growth; it does not require maintaining the status quo. Rather, it necessarily entails trade-offs. A generation may use up more resources, but leave to its successor levels of capital and knowledge sufficient to develop alternatives. To apply this principle for practical decision-making, a framework for judging such trade-offs must be developed, including predictive indices of resource quality and diversity.
Conservation of access guarantees that the principle of fairness that underlies intergenerational equity also holds within generations, so that every member of each generation can enjoy as an individual a fair share of the heritage that is passed from one generation to the next as a group.
Implementing planetary rights
Future generations have little or no representation in economic decision-making processes today. Nonetheless, economic instruments can be developed to achieve intergenerational equity efficiently. In theory, the State has the primary duty to implement and enforce the shared planetary rights of all citizens, both present and future. For administrative and judicial decisions, a public office could be created to ensure that the interests of future generations are observed and represented. Such an ombudsman could have standing locally, nationally, or internationally [30] .
Weiss proposes an initial step in formulating planetary rights: to consider drafting a Declaration of Planetary Obligations and Rights. This, she believes would encourage cooperation between countries and among communities to fulfill obligations to future generations. The process of codifying such obligations would reduce ambiguities about expected behavior and separate cooperative behavior from uncooperative behavior [30] .
The role of ethics in the climate change negotiations process
Anthropogenic climate change lies at the intersection of the Earth's ecosystems with humanity's socio-economic systems, raising the fundamental question of how much each might potentially damage the other. At this intersection, uncertainties abound about the magnitude and timing of the overall warming, the severity and geographical distribution of its consequences, and the costs of mitigation and adaptation. With its tangled interplay of science and politics, economics and ecology, the climate policy issue seems "the apotheosis of the idea that everything relates to everything else." [32] Given the difficulty of the subject and huge economic stakes involved, greenhouse diplomacy is bound to be nearly as complicated as atmospheric chemistry.
Multiple parties, each with multiple interests, grapple with myriad inter-related issues and make judgments based on conflicting values. National negotiators struggle to design solutions that are optimal and fair, and at the same time acceptable both to their domestic constituencies and to their counter-part parties. In the language of game theory, there may be no 'Condorcet' winner among the parties' preferences, no dominant alternative that would best each of the others in a series of pair-wise comparisons. Parties may remain firmly committed to outcomes that are mutually exclusive.
To confront successfully the risks of rapid, anthropogenic climate change, the parties to the UN Climate Convention must cooperate in averting or managing the risks of global warming. In economic terms, the planet's climate system is an international public good. It is indivisible and non-exclusive; no one can be kept from its use. Greenhouse gas emissions are an international public 'bad'. They represent a negative externality, imposing costs on others that are unpaid by the emitters. But no one country will choose to act unilaterally to cut its emissions, out of fear of constraining its development or giving unfair advantage to its competitors. While the benefits of unchecked emissions accrue to the polluter and the damages are spread across the globe, the cost of reductions must be borne by the emitting party alone, leaving all others to enjoy the benefits that accrue from avoided emissions.
At the same time, no state can be sure it is invulnerable to a greenhouse warming. Nor can any country fend off climate change by itself, as no individual country's emissions are so large or its 'sinks' so commodious that its unilateral actions could significantly abate global warming. No country has a 'greenhouse hegemony', able single-handedly to supply the world with the public good of a stable climate.
The climate negotiations under the UN FCCC have attempted to overcome this collective action problem. Like most complex multilateral negotiations, greenhouse diplomacy seeks to devise rules to coordinate state conduct rather than to divide tangible goods [33] . But achieving this goal is confounded by the plethora of interests and issues involved, leaving no easy path to agreement on what the rules should be. In complex, multiparty conferences, the negotiators can have great difficulty following the permutations of all the positions in play, not to mention tracking the implications for their own strategies of the various proposals on the table. [34] Under these circumstances, parties often seek to manage complexity by employing simplifying structures, forming coalitions, linking issues in packages or trade-offs, thus finding acceptable formulas with which to orient themselves in their deliberations (e.g. 'Cuius regio eius religio', [33, 34] ).
Some simplifying structures, however, exercise more attraction than others. Rules or results deemed to be 'equitable' or 'just' could hold particular power to focus the participants' attention. Some outcomes may derive great force from their perceived fairness and thereby appear as the salient solution to the bargaining problem. By the same token, experimental evidence indicates, such great power of 'fairness', that bargaining partners will often defy economic rationality and reject gains that would increase Pareto optimality rather than accept a distribution believed to be unfair [35] .
Since all countries contribute to the greenhouse effect and all are potentially vulnerable to its impacts, principles of fairness would seem to offer great promise for cutting through the complexities of the climate change negotiations. Adam Rose captured the view of many academic observers and official participants by observing:
"there is a need for a unifying principle that facilitates cooperation among nations." "The efficiency of resource allocation on a global scale is unlikely to be a sufficient rallying point because it does not address the tendency toward national self-interest, the ability of nations to pay the cost, or international political balance. An equity principle, or ethical basis for a fair sharing of abatement costs and benefits, which is operational in the international arena, may be the most effective alternative." [36] The Ministers attending the Second World Climate Conference (1990) agreed, concluding "The principle of equity and the common but differentiated responsibility of countries should be the basis of any global response to climate change" [37] . The UN Framework Convention itself establishes equity as a fundamental guidepost. It adds an inter-temporal consideration, asserting, "The parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities." [13] There are many equity principles that could be (and have been) called upon to allocate the burdens and responsibilities of responding to climate change among countries and across generations. Not surprisingly, economists and philosophers as well as the negotiators themselves disagree on what these principles are.
They range from formula grounded on ethical arguments (e.g., historical or current responsibility for climate change, equal per capita entitlements to the global atmosphere, willingness to pay for greenhouse damages, comparable burdens, the status quo, or combinations of the above), to ad hoc criteria based on land area or economic measures [38] . Peter Timmerman has grouped many of the options and their policy implications into five ethical categories [39] . His groupings include the following:
1 The Utilitarian Market Argument (e.g., as illustrated by William Nordhaus) applies ethical criteria of efficiency, or cost-benefit, to weigh response options, seeking to maximize present utility and minimize costs;
2 The 'Realist' or Hobbesian Common Model (e.g., as illustrated by Thomas Schelling) interprets the climate change dilemma as a question of international power relations in which self-interested states should try to shift the costs of responding to others rather than submit to mutual coercion for joint benefit;
3 The Equitable Commons Model (e.g., as illustrated by Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain) asserts that GHG emissions rights should be distributed to all the world's citizens on an equal per capita basis;
4 The Fiduciary Trust Model (as illustrated, for example, by Edith Brown Weiss) views humans as trustees of the Earth, and assumes that each generation has a responsibility to preserve the planet's natural and human heritage at a level no worse than that at which they were received;
5 The Earthrights Model (e.g., as illustrated by the 'Deep Ecologists') resembles the fiduciary trust, but argues not only for protecting the welfare of human beings, but puts equal concern on all beings flourishing on the planet.
Each of Timmerman's categories is founded on a different conception of intergenerational equity. The Utilitarian Market Argument holds that the future (discounted) benefits of present actions should be greater than or equal to the present costs of those actions. Present generations should not be called upon to sacrifice unduly for the future. At the same time, by efficiently employing present resources to increase capital, today's generation can pass on a greater wealth to its progeny. The Equitable Commons Model gives each member of future generations a per capita emissions allowance equal to that of their contemporaries, or in some formulations equal to that of all people in all generations [40] . The Fiduciary Trust approach contends that each generation must safeguard the heritage it receives from its predecessors, increasing well-being where it can and compensating any consequential losses from its own actions. Earthrights augments this position with a kind of substitutability argument that human well-being in any generation should be restricted in order to maintain or improve the well-being of the planet.
So, which principle of equity should the parties to the Climate Convention apply? Neither scientists nor economists, otherwise so indispensable to making sound climate policy, can resolve such debates or relieve negotiators from the burden of decision. Neither atmospheric chemistry nor cost benefit analysis alone is sufficient to attribute past responsibility for potential climate change, assign present obligations to act, or define the present generation's duties to the future. These are value judgements. As Max Weber, the German sociologist who first examined the claims of technical elites to fashion policy, once wrote, "[a]n empirical science cannot tell anyone what he should do -but rather what he can do" [41] . Even so narrowed, the universe of choice remains large. Any number of plausible policy options can legitimately appeal to the same facts. No empirical description of reality, no matter how exact and exhaustive, can determine a unique normative prescription to which all must subscribe.
Given the range of potentially conflicting or contradictory approaches to intergenerational equity, it is not surprising that the parties to the UN Climate Convention have failed so far to agree on a unified strategy for achieving the Convention's objective. Thousands of years of reflecting upon Truth, Justice, the Good, and the Right have brought philosophers no closer than the these current negotiators to a single, indisputable answer to the question "What is Fair?"
Conclusions
The risks of rapid, anthropogenic climate change are real, profound, and serious. The impacts of climate change due to greenhouse gas build-up will extend from decades to centuries. Scientists cannot predict the timing or geographic distribution of the negative impacts with confidence today. But if current trends continue, some of the impacts may be irreversible and others may lead to major changes of state in the planetary system.
No one country or generation can successfully abate the risks of climate change. No country or region can be certain that it will evade the worst impacts. Long lag times separate the timing of mitigation measures implemented today and the reduction of impacts experienced by future generations.
Successfully reducing the risks of rapid climate change will require widespread international cooperation lasting over many decades. In assessing potential policy responses to the risks of anthropogenic climate change, political decision-makers must consider the trade-offs between consumption today (with its attendant risks and consequences) and investment today that is designed to provide a better, less dangerous, environment for future generations.
Evaluating these options will require many tools. Conventional economic analysis provides a quantitative framework for comparing some of the costs of action today against some of the estimated future benefits. But the inability of this computational framework to account for irreversible impacts or major discontinuities in the behaviour of the planetary system limits its effectiveness in choosing sound climate policies. In addition, decision-makers must look to the insights of international law and modern ethical theory as they seek to find cooperative strategies capable of addressing the challenges and managing the risks of rapid, anthropogenic climate change due to the build-up of greenhouse gases.
